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JULY-AUGUST, 1961 DICTA
COLORADO'S MAXIMUM RECOVERY FOR
WRONGFUL DEATH v. THE CONSTITUTION
By M. NEAL SINGER*
This note was awarded the 1961 Omar E. Garwood Memorial
Prize bf $100 in a competition sponsored by the Association of Colo-
rado Claimants' Attorneys.
Thirteen states today' are depriving their citizens of a basic
constitutional right. They have restricted recovery in death actions,
even where losses greatly exceed limitation figures. Some courts,
when presented with the problem, have attempted to evade the
issue by placing responsibility upon the legislature.2 This note at-
tempts to analyze the situation and point out the inevitable solu-
tion-the duty of protecting property rights rests with the judiciary.
I. BACKGROUND: STATUTORY HISTORY AND INTERPRETATION
The old common law rule that no cause of action exists for a
wrongful death dates back to 1607. 3 It was crystallized by Lord
Ellenborough in his instruction to the jury in Baker v. Bolton.
4
Most authorities on the subject conclude that no satisfactory rea-
sons for the rule have ever been advanced.5
England, in 1846, attempted to provide a remedy for this obvi-
ous common law defect through the enactment commonly referred
to as Lord Campbell's Act.6 It is important to note that the act con-
tains no limitation of damages, but leaves the amount of recovery
in the hands of the jury:
... and in every such action the jury may give such dam-
ages as they may think proportioned to the injury result-
ing from such death to the parties respectively for whom
and for whose benefit such action shall be brought .... 7
Colorado, in 1872, passed a statute patterned after Lord Camp-
bell's Act wherein a deceased's personal representative could main-
tain an action for the benefit of specified beneficiaries (spouse, then
*Student, University of Denver College of Low.
1 See note 17 ,infro.
2 See note 28 infra.
3 Huggins v. Butcher, 1 Brownl. & Golds. 205, Yelv. 89, 80 Eng. Rep. 61 (1607).
4 1 Camp. 493, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (1808).
5 See Holdsworth, Origin of the Rule in Baker v. Bolton, 32 L. Q. Rev. 431 (1916); Prosser, Torts
105 at 710 (2d ed. 1955), states: ". . . result [of the common law rule] was that it was more
profitable for the defendant to kill the plaintiff than to scratch him, and that the most grievous
of all injuries left the bereaved family of the victim, who frequently were destitute, without a
remedy."
6 Stat. 9, 10 Vict. c. 93 (1846):
"It is Enacted,
I. That whensoever the death of a person shall be caused by wrongful act, neglect, or default,
and the act, neglect, or default is such as would (if death had not ensued) have entitled the party
injured to maintain an action and recover damages in respect thereof, then and in every such case
the person who would have been liable if death had not ensued shall be liable to an action for
damages, notwithstanding the death of the person injured, and although the death shall have been
caused under such circumstances as amount in law to felony.
I1. That every such action shall be for the benefit of the wife, husband, parent and child of
the person whose death shall have been so caused, and shall be brought by and in the name of the
executor or administrator of the person deceased; and in every such action the jury may give such
damages as they may think proportioned to the injury resulting from such death to the parties re-
spectively for whom and for whose benefit such action shall be brought; and the amount so recovered,
after deducting the costs not recovered from the defendant, shall be divided amongst the before-
mentioned parties in such shares as the jury by their verdict shall find and direct."
7 Stat. 9, 10 Vict. ch. 93, § 11 (1846).
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children, then father or mother).8 This original statute did not
limit the amount of recovery. However, the legislature amended
the statute in 1877 and inserted a limitation of $5,000 maximum
recovery. 9 Colorado has construed the act to be compensatory and
has held that recovery is "limited to the pecuniary loss resulting
from the death, to the party who may be entitled to sue."'" It [the
act] is always described as compensatory, and never as a solace
for wounded feelings."'" Compensatory damages have been defined
as "the estimated accumulations of the deceased during the prob-
able remainder of his life, if he had not come to an accidental death,
having reference to his age, occupation, habits, bodily health and
ability.
1 2
Mollie Gibson Consol. Mining & Milling Co. v. Sharp" deter-
mined that the act of 1877 was not unconstitutional merely because
it was a general title, broad enough to include all appropriate mat-
ters (constitutionality of the $5,000 maximum, however, was not
discussed) .14
Colorado's recovery limitation was raised from $5,000 to $10,000
in 1951.15 This figure was increased in 1957 to $25,000, our present
maximum.
16
II. STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS-OTHER STATES
Although statutory provisions for death recovery are found in
every jurisdiction, only thirteen states have retained maximum
limitations. 17  Constitutions in at least eight states specifically pro-
vide that there shall be no statutory maximum limitation upon re-
covery in death actions.'
In general, the measure of damages is based on earning capa-
city (at least this is one element to be considered by the jury).19
Language similar to the following indicates today's prevailing view:
8 Colo. H. Jour. 9th Sess. (1872).
9 Colo. Sess. Laws 1877 ch. XXV, § 879 (3).
10 Denver & Rio Grande Ry. v. Spencer, 25 Colo. 9, 14, 52 Pac. 211, 213 (1898).
11 Mollie Gibson Consol. Mining & Milling Co. v. Sharp, 5 Colo. App. 321, 327, 38 Pac. 850,
B52 (1894).
12 Hayes v. Willis, 17 Colo. 465, 474, 30 Pac. 352, 355 (1892).
13 Supra note 11.
14 See Colo. Const. art. V, § 21, requiring that any bill contain only one subject, which must
be clearly expressed in its title.
15 Colo. Rev. Star. 41-1-3 (1953).
16 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 41-1-3 (1957).
17 State Statute Maximum Limitation
Colorado § 41-1-3 $25,000
Illinois § 70-1-2 $30,000
Kansas § § 60-3203, 3204 $25,000
Maine ch. 165, § 9, 10; ch. 188 $20,000 (plus listed expenses)
Massachusetts ch. 238 $2,000 - $20,000, depending on culpability.
Minnesota § 573.02 $25,000
Missouri t 537.090 $25,000
New Hampshire ch. 556, § § 11 -13; ch. 91 $10,000 ($25,000 with widow, widower, minor
child or children, or dependent father or
mother)
Oregon § § 30.020, 121.020 $20,000
South Dakota 37.22 $20,000
Virginia § 635, 636. 638 $30,000
West Virginia ch. 55, art. 7, § 6 $20,000
Wisconsin § 331-03-04 $22,500 (with additions for more children)
18 State: Arizona, art. 1, k 31; Arkansas, art. V, 32; Kentucky, § 54; New York, art. 1, § 16;
Ohio, art. I, § 19 (a); Oklahoma, art. 23, § 7; Pennsylvania, art. 3, § 21; Utah, art. XVI, 1 5.'
19 See Klepal v. Pa. R.R., 129 F. Supp. 668, oft'd, 229 F. 2d 610 (1956); Boise Payette Lumber Co.
v. Larsen, 214 F.2d 373 (1954); Holliday v. Pac. Ati. S.S. Co., 117 F. Supp. 729, aff'd, 212 F.2d 2C6
(1954); Frabutt v. N.Y. Central & St. Louis Ry., 84 F. Supp. 460 (1949); Hayes v. Williams, 17 Colo.
465, 30 Pac. 352 (1892); McKirdy v. Coscia, 142 Conn. 80, III A. 2d 555 (1955); Seaboard Air Line
R.R. v. Martin, 56 So. 2d 509 (Fla. 1952); Louisville & N. R.R. v. Young's Adm'x, 253 S.W.2d 585
(Ky. 1952); Hall v. Stiles, 57 N.M. 281, 258 P.2d 386 (1953).
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"the amount of damages [in death actions I is primarily for the jury
to determine, and . . .its verdict will not be disturbed except where
abuse of its discretion clearly appears. -2 It is obvious that only by
discarding any semblance of logic can the mechanical approach of
a recovery maximum apply.
III. COLORADO AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
The constitution of Colorado provides:
In order to assert our rights, acknowledge our duties,
and proclaim the principles upon which our government is
20 Checkettes v. Bowman, 70 Idoho 463, 220 P.2d 682, 684 (1950).
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founded, we declare: . . . [That] all persons have certain
natural, essential and inalienable rights, among which may
be reckoned the right of enjoying and defending their lives
and liberties; that of acquiring, possessing and protecting
property; and of seeking and obtaining their safety and
happiness.
2'
• . . [That] courts of justice shall be open to every person,
and a speedy remedy afforded for every injury to person,
property, or character; and that right and justice should be
administered without sale, denial or delay.22 . .. [That] no
person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, with-
out due process of law.
23
These rights are derived from the natural law and given constitu-
tional sanction!
It appears that the Colorado Supreme Court has interpreted
the right of recovery for wrongful death to be a property right:
. .. in contemplation of the Death Act plaintiff has sus-
tained a property damage attendant upon the death of her
husband. If, since the death was caused by injuries inflict-
ed through negligence, a tort action terminology must be
employed in describing the nature of plaintiff's action, it
can be classified as a property tort action and cannot be
classified as a tort action "for injuries done to the per-
son .... "24
In Rosane v. Senger,25 a malpractice suit which held that the statute
of limitations began to run only upon patient's discovery of the
gauze negligently left inside the wound, the court stated that "A
legal right to damage for an injury is property and one cannot be
deprived of his property without due process. There can be no due
process unless the party deprived has his day in court....
"A vested right of action is property in the same sense in which
tangible things are property, and is equally protected against arbi-
trary interference."
27
Before determining whether this property right is protected by
the constitution of Colorado (and the federal constitution), it must
first be decided whether it really is a right. Since the old common
law concept is that there is no right of action for wrongful death,
the argument arises that legislative action gives birth to a "privi-
lege," and not to a "right." In fact, one Illinois decision upholds the
constitutionality of the Illinois Death Act on this basis.28 The court
there indicated that when further legislative action appeared likely,
such likelihood has always mitigated against judicial change. How-
ever, as shown above, all fifty states provide a remedy for wrongful
death by statute and thirty-seven states have no statutory maxi-
mum (some by express constitutional provision, others without ex-
press authority in their constitutions29). On this basis, one finds it
21 Colo. Const. art. II, 3 (Emphasis added.)
22 Colo. Const. art. II, 6.
23 Colo. Const. art. II, § 25.
24 Fish v. Liley, 120 Colo. 156, 163, 208 P.2d 930, 933 (1949). (Emphasis added.)
25 112 Colo. 363, 149 P.2d 372 (1944).
26 Id. at 370, 149 P.2d at 375.
27 2 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations 756 (8th ed. 1927); and cases cited in the footnote.
28 Hall v. Gillins, 13 111.2d 26, 147 N.E.2d 352 (1958).
29 Supra notes 17, 18.
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difficult to validly argue that a "right" has not arisen. Use of the
word "privilege" is obviously erroneous when describing an action
to sue for wrongful death. Consequently, one must be lead to con-
clude that the common law has been extended into this area-
though it was accomplished by means of decisions dealing with the
statutes.
Since an action for wrongful death is a matter of substance-
a property right-it should be protected by the above provisions
of the Colorado Constitution. 30 Justice Franz, dissenting in a recent
Colorado decision 3' upholding the constitutionality of the guest
statute, stated:
Provisions of a Bill of Rights are primarily limitations
on government, declaring rights that exist without any
governmental grant, that may not be taken away by gov-
ernment and that government has the duty to protect . . .32
As those authorities show, any governmental action in vio-
lation of these declared rights is void so that provisions of
the Bill of Rights are self executing to this extent. ... .3
The bill of rights does not exist in a vacuum; but this effect
substantially occurs when a right is created and recovery (the
remedy) upon this right is so limited that only a partial remedy
arises. Is the total injury redressed by only a partial or limited
relief?
The Constitution of the United States provides:
The citizens of each State shall be entitled to all pri-
vileges and immunities of citizens in the several states.
3 4
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal pro-
tection of the laws.
3 5
It appears that the Constitution secures in each state to citizens of
all other states "the right by the usual modes to acquire and hold
property, and to protect and defend the same in law.
3 6
The right to bring an action for wrongful death, being a prop-
erty right, must also fall within the protection of "due process. '37
The state is depriving a plaintiff of this right by limiting recovery
just as effectively as if it were to completely remove the remedy.
Where one has sustained a loss, he should be compensated for the
full amount of his damage. To limit recovery is to say: "Whether
your loss is determined to be $25,000 or $250,000, you may only re-
cover $25,000." For practical purposes, therefore, only the poor can
afford to be killed in Colorado!
In Stoltz v. Burlington Transp. Co.,33 plaintiff brought an action
in Colorado to recover for the death of his son, caused by defend-
30 Supro notes 21, 22, 23.
31 Taylor v. Welle, 352 P.2d 106 (Colo. 1960).
32 See I Cooley, Constitutional Limitations 93, 358 (8th ed. 1927); I Am. Jur Constitutional Low
§ 308 (1937); 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 199 (1956).
33 Supra note 30 at 110, the court cites Quinn -. Buchanan, 298 S.W.2d 413 (Mo. 1957).
34 U.S. Const. art. IV, § 2 (1).
35 U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, § 1.
36 2 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations 821 (8th ed. 1927). (Emphasis added.)
37 Supra note 34.
38 178 F.2d 574 (10th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 929 (1949).
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ant's negligent act occurring in Utah. The court held that amount
of recovery is governed by the lex loci and not by the lex fori.
Therefore, Utah's statutes and constitution determined the amount
of recovery upon plaintiff's property "right." This decision leads
to a frightening analogy. If a man earning $200,000 per annum
were to be negligently killed on the Colorado-Wyoming border
(Colorado -$25,000 limitation; Wyoming-no limitation), then a
matter of inches would determine whether his personal representa-
tive were to receive $500,000 or $25,000. At the same time, both
states maintain that the damages awarded shall be fair compensa-
tion for resulting "pecuniary" injuries.3 9
The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is one that seeks
an equality of treatment of all persons, even though they enjoy the
protection of due process. It does not prohibit legislation which is
limited either in the objects to which it is directed or by the terri-
tory within which it is to operate, but merely requires that all per-
sons subject to such legislation shall be treated alike, under like
circumstances and conditions, both in privileges conferred and lia-
bilities imposed.4  Following this reasoning, one might logically
conclude that equal protection is not denied by limited recovery. It
can be shown that the act applies equally to all citizens of the
state. This point, however, serves as mere dictum when its advo-
cate attempts to by-pass the safeguards guaranteed by due process.
Here, the state is not varying the procedural aspects, which are
permitted under the equal protection clause, 4t but there are sub-
stantive rights involved. Numerous decisions prevail wherein
plaintiff's property rights were protected, thus allowing him full
recovery for his damage and providing due process under the con-
stitution.
42
IV. DECISIONS IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS UPHOLDING DEATH ACTS
In Carroll v. Missouri Pac. Ry. 43 the Missouri court awarded
damages of $5,000, the maximum amount permitted by statute. De-
fendant's special defense that the damage act was unconstitutional
because the amount of recovery was fixed at $5,000, was not al-
lowed. The court held the act constitutional, basing this conclusion
on (1) the fact that a decision of unconstitutionality "would in-
validate a very large number of other sections in our statutes,"44
and (2) the fact that other similar sections and provisions of the
39 St. Lukes Hasp. Ass'n. v. Long, 125 Colo. 25, 240 P.2d 917 (1952); Denver & Rio Grande Ry.
v. Spencer, 25 Colo. 9, 52 Poc. 211 (1898); Colo. Coal & Iron Co. v. Lamb, 6 Colo. App. 255, 40 Poc.
251 (1895); Mollie Gibson Consol. Mining & Milling Co. v. Sharp, 5 Colo. App. 321, 38 Pac. 850 (1894);
Pierce v. Connors, 20 Colo. 178, 37 Pac. 721 (1894); Coliseum Motor Co. v. Hester, 43 Wyo. 298,
3 P.2d 105 (1931).
40 2 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations 824 (8th ed. 1927).
41 Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U.S. 22 (1879).
42 0'Toole v. U.S., 342 F.2d 308 (1957) where an award of $400,000 damages for wrongful
death of a 54 year old man with annual earnings of $250,000, and a life expectancy of at least
10 years, was not excessive; New York, N.H. & H.R. Co. v. Zermani, 200 F.2d 240 (1st Cir. 1952),
judgment for $141,500 aff'd; McKee v. Jamestown Baking Co., 198 F.2d 551 (3rd Cir. 1952), verdict
for $69,769.55 held not excessive; Frazier v. Ewell Eng'r & Contracting Co., 62 So.2d 51 (Fla. 1952),
judgment on verdict of $66,000 entered; Sandifer Oil Co. v. Dew, 220 Miss. 609, 71 So.2d 752 (1954),
an action to recover damages for death of 14 year-old girl caused by gasoline explosion, where it
was held that an award of $90,000 damages was not excessive; Curtis v. Atchison, 363 Mo. 779,
253 S.W.2d 789 (1952), verdict of $60,000, on appeal, reduced by remittitur to $40,000; Hicklin v.
Jeff Hunt Mach. Co., 226 S.C. 484, 85 S.E.2d 739 (1955), verdict and judgment for $30,000 aff'd;
Mock v. Ati. Coast Line Ry., 227 S.C. 245, 87 S.E.2d 833 (1955), verdict awarding $50,COO actual plus
$15,000 punit:ve damages not excessive.
43 88 Mo. 239, 57 Am. Rep. 382 (1885).
44 Id. at 246.
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law had been "heretofore declared constitutional," citing Missouri
Pac. Ry. v. Hume.
45
Upon careful examination of the Carroll case, it is evident that
no constitutional question was actually decided. The first reason
set forth, (1) above, bears no semblance to the constitutional policy
of protecting and preserving individual property rights. Authori-
ties cited to support the remainder of the decision, (2) above, were
not in point. Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Hume upheld a Missouri statute
which imposed double damages on any railroad corporation not
complying with requirements of erecting and maintaining cattle
guards and fences on the sides of its roads, stating there were no
violations of due process or equal protection. This was a penal
statute and had no provisions for limiting recovery rights-factors
creating a weak precedent for the decision.
The Illinois Wrongful Death Act, limiting recovery to $25,000,46
has been held constitutional.47 Rationale for this decision rested
upon three foundations: (1) The legislature created both the right
and the remedy, and its power to limit the maximum recovery in
the action that it created can not be questioned; (2) The common
law has characteristically imposed close limitations upon the par-
ties entitled to sue. If the deceased had survived, his injuries might
have been such as to inflict upon these plaintiffs deprivations of the
same kind and of equal severity. Yet the only person entitled to
recover would be the injured man himself; (3) The differences be-
tween the action sought to be maintained and the action that is
available under the statute are not sufficiently significant to war-
rant recognition of a new remedy, because this point of great con-
cern has been the subject of frequent legislative attention;4 the
likelihood of further legislative action has always militated against
judicial change.
In (1) above, it is conceded that the legislature originally
created the right and the remedy. However, Colorado has inter-
preted the right as being one of property, 49 consequently, the right
45 115 U.S. 512 (1885).
46 III. Rev. Stat., ch. 70 (1) (2) (1957).
47 Hall v. G:llins, 13 111.2d 26, 147 N.E.2d 352 (1958).
48 Amount of recovery in Illinois was increased to $10,000 in 1903, to $15,000 in 1947, to
$20,000 in 1951, to $25,000 in 1955, and to $30,000 in 1957.






is protected by the constitution. In (2) above, the Illinois court
apparently overlooks the fact that an action for wrongful death is
a "new cause of action"-not a "survival" statute.
50 Therefore, the
court's analogy is misleading.
Finally, in (3) above, the court refuses to act because "further
legislative action appears likely." Surely, this is no reason to de-
prive a person of his constitutional rights. If our legislature is sub-
ject to a strong insurance lobby, then the courts must protect the
rights of the individual from the profit-motivated forces of these
organizations. If the only solution is for the courts to create a new
cause of action, then so be it! Rights guaranteed by the constitu-
tion must be protected from legislative abuse.
As was stated in Muller v. Oregon,-"' " [I] t is the peculiar value
of a written constitution that it places in unchanging form limita-
tions upon legislative action, and thus gives a permanence and sta-
bility to popular government which otherwise would be lacking.
' '52
CONCLUSION
It is not a valid argument that the majority of death actions
involve amounts under $25,000 (or $35,000, or whatever a future
limitation might be). State action in this area must be derived from
its sovereign or police power. Surely, the enactment of the wrong-
ful death limitation cannot be said to be reasonably calculated to
protect the health, safety, welfare or morals of the people of Colo-
rado. Traditionally the amount of recovery for property loss is de-
termined by a jury. Little justification can be found for a legisla-
ture's substitution of a mechanical barrier when the property right
happens to be the support and comfort of a loved one. Mr. Justice
Cardozo has observed:'
Death statutes have their roots in dissastifaction with
the archaisms of the law ... It would be a misfortune if a
narrow or grudging process of construction were to ex-
emplify and perpetuate the very evils to be remedied.
53
Modern reasons for existence of a maximum recovery limit are
(1) the difficulty of measuring damages arising by reason of the
wrongful death of a person, and (2) the possibility of extreme
awards being made by juries due to the strong feelings of sym-
pathy aroused by such cases. 54 The obvious answer to this reason-
ing is that constitutional safeguards should not be removed merely
because the problem becomes more difficult or because emotionally
toned verdicts become possible. These should never be grounds for
refusal of adequate relief in a modern court system.
Through legislative enactment, a child today has a right en-
forceable in a court of law against one who has deprived him of
support and maintenance of his father, as well as damages for loss
of other rights arising out of the family relationship destroyed or
defeated by a wrong-doing third party. Further legislation to limit
the amount of recovery upon this right now vested, materially and
unconstitutionally impairs its intended substance.
50 Fish v. Liley, supro note 24.
51 208 U.S. 412 (1907).
52 Id. at 420.
53 Von Beech v. Sabine Towing Co., 300 U.S. 342, 350 (1937).
54 16 Am. Jur. Death § 184 (1938).
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